offered insightful observations on earlier drafts of the paper. Reed Nelson and three anonymous ASQ reviewers gave us very useful criticisms of the manuscript after submission. Finally, Linda Johanson provided numerous editorial suggestions, which greatly improved the presentation. This paper analyzes data on 461 large U.S. industrial corporations to determine the factors that led large firms to participate in the wave of diversifying acquisitions that peaked in the late 1960s. We elaborate and test a class theory of corporate acquisitions, maintaining that firms pursued acquisitions in this period when they were commanded by well-networked challengers who were central in elite social networks but relatively marginal with respect to social status, isolated from the resistance of established elites, and free from control of owning families. We also consider a wide range of factors highlighted by alternative accounts of acquisition likelihood, including resource dependence, institutional pressures, and principal-agent conflicts. The results provide support for our main theoretical arguments, even when controls related to alternative explanations are taken into account.s 
more inclined to pursue acquisitions because they are less thoroughly socialized and socially controlled to conform to accepted business practice, with which innovative acquisitions can conflict. The idea that status marginality stimulates the adoption of innovations has been advanced in other contexts, such as the diffusion of new agricultural practices and radio broadcasting industry strategies (cf. Park, 1950; Menzel, 1960; Cancian, 1967; Leblebici et al., 1991) . Domhoff (1970) argued that social status in the U.S. is reflected in attendance at exclusive secondary schools (such as Groton) and inclusion in restricted metropolitan social registers (such as the Cleveland Blue Book). Only descendents of families of longstanding wealth and social prominence gain admission to such schools and listing in such registers. Baltzell (1958 Baltzell ( , 1964 ) maintained that social status in the U.S. has been segregated along religious and regional lines. He characterized the upper class as a Protestant and northeastern phenomenon. Thus, it is not surprising that Espeland and Hirsch (1990: 84) described the corporate elite members who pursued diversifying acquisitions in the 1 960s merger wave as "self-made men." Hirsch (1986) and Espeland and Hirsch (1990) also described these elite members as being disproportionately Jewish and from the South or West. None of these arguments on social status have been tested empirically. We test them in this paper in the following hypotheses: Hi: Firms run by top managers who attended an exclusive secondary school or whose family was listed in a metropolitan social register were less likely than other firms to complete diversifying acquisitions in the 1960s. 
Social Network Embeddedness
Embeddedness in social networks generated by common memberships in exclusive organizations is another dimension of the class system and thus another axis along which corporate elite members can be distinguished from one another (Domhoff, 1967 (Domhoff, , 1970 . Corporate elite members come to know and develop relationships with one another through common memberships in exclusive social clubs and corporate boards of directors. Domhoff's (1974) in-depth case analysis of one exclusive club clearly demonstrates the social network-generating function of such clubs. Koenig and Gogel (1981) have conducted quantitative empirical analyses that testify to the social network significance of corporate boards. Corporate elite members who belong to many clubs and boards are the most prominent and powerful members of the business community, sometimes referred to as the "inner group" of the capitalist class (Zeitlin, Ratcliff, and Ewen, 1974; Useem, 1979) . Several organizational theorists believe that embeddedness in elite social networks is associated with acquisition behavior. The idea that network embedded-90/ASQ, March 2001 ness stimulates the adoption of innovations has been advanced in other contexts, such as the adoption of new pharmaceutical treatments and hostile corporate takeover defense tactics (Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, 1957; Rogers, 1962 ; Davis, 1991; Davis and Greve, 1997).
Most think that acquisition behavior diffuses through the network of interlocking directorates (Haunschild, 1993; Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley, 1995; Haunschild and Beckman, 1998). When a corporation's managers sit on another firm's board of directors, they create "sent" interlocks between their corporation and the other firm. In the process, they obtain access to information about and from that firm, which might provide them with knowledge about diversifying acquisitions, the financing strategies and takeover tactics used to complete them, and the identity of willing or vulnerable targets. They also obtain formal authority over that firm, which might provide them with influence over people who control access to capital or hold decision-making authority over specific desired targets. Stearns and Allan (1996) 
Resistance of the Established Elite
The potential of the established elite to resist the spread of innovations adopted by challengers is implicit in discussions of status marginality. If challengers had an incentive to pursue diversifying acquisitions in the 1960s, then members of the established elite should have had an equally compelling incentive to squelch these acquisitions. Some believe that the Williams Act of 1969, which helped bring an end to the 1960s merger wave, was engineered by the established corporate elite (Austin and Fishman, 1970; Hirsch, 1986; Espeland and Hirsch, 1990). Among other things, this law required bidders to line up assured financing before announcing a tender offer and extended the time within which targets could arrange a defense after receiving an offer. Established elite members might defend the existing order through ( 2 Twelve firms were dropped from our analysis because they were foreign or domestic subsidiaries or because they were in the process of being liquidated or acquired on January 1, 1963. Another ten firms, for which we were unable to obtain stock ownership data, were also dropped. Thirteen firms were dropped from our analysis because market returns data were missing for one or more years. Finally, four firms were dropped for miscellaneous reasons.
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We grouped product extension and conglomerate acquisitions together because we think these two types of acquisitions are intimately related to one another. Both increase a firm's industrial diversity. In fact, while individual product extension acquisitions do not add unrelated businesses to a firm's complement of activities, a series of product extension acquisitions can produce a firm that many observers would characterize as a conglomerate. Hence, some economists treat both types of acquisitions as instances of conglomerate combination in this period (Weston, Kwong, and Hoag, 1990: 13). If product extension acquisitions were not intimately related to conglomerate combinations, it would be hard to understand why the 1960s merger wave is generally categorized as a conglomerate movement. The Federal Trade Commission report that we used to track acquisitions coded only 18 percent of all large acquisitions in this period and only 21 percent of the diversifying acquisitions in our data set as conglomerate acquisitions. Still, it is true that pure conglomerate acquisitions are the most extreme variety of diversifying acquisition. We did separate analyses to see if the determinants of this extreme form of diversification are different from the factors leading to less extreme forms (available on request), but we found few statistically significant predictors of conglomerate acquisition likelihood. This may reflect the fact that there are relatively few pure conglomerate acquisitions in our period (only 2 percent of the 2,510 firm-year observations in our sample registered a pure conglomerate acquisition) and that, as a consequence, our separate analysis of these acquisitions lacked sufficient power. In product extension acquisitions, the industries in which combining firms produce are related to one another in some way (as is the case when a corporation that produces crude oil, petroleum, and natural gas purchases a firm that manufacturers fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals). In conglomerate acquisitions, the industries of combining firms are essentially unrelated (as is the case when a corporation that produces sewing machines, vacuum cleaners, and other home appliances purchases a firm that manufactures data processing equipment).3 The date on which each acquisition began was obtained from the Wall Street Journal Index. One hundred and fifty (33 percent) of the firms in our data set completed a diversifying acquisition in our period. About two-thirds of these completed only one diversifying acquisition, one-fifth completed two acquisitions, and less than one-tenth completed three or more.
We estimated count and binary regression models of the likelihood that corporations completed diversifying acquisitions between 1963 and 1968. Each firm's acquisition record was divided into six annual spells. For the count models, each firm-year observation was assigned the number of diversifying acquisitions completed by the firm in that year. We used Poisson regression to model this outcome, because diagnostics revealed that the data were not overdispersed (McCullagh and Nelder, 1983). For the binary regression models, each firm-year observation was coded 1 if the firm completed a diversifying acquisition in that year and coded 0 otherwise. We used logistic regression to model this dichotomous outcome (Allison, 1982 (Allison, , 1984 . Logit coefficients, which indicate the effect of a one-unit change in a covariate on the log-odds of a firm completing a diversifying acquisition in a year, were translated into values indicating effects on the probability of completing a diversifying acquisition (AP) using a formula suggested by Petersen (1985 regression models can be considered inferior to the count models because they ignore information about multiple acquisitions in the same year. On the other hand, they can be considered superior to the count models because they are less sensitive to the impact of acquisitive outliers. Only 27 of the 2,510 spells in our data set registered multiple acquisitions, and just four firms were responsible for 10 of these spells. We consider support for hypotheses to be strong when both types of models provide confirmatory results and to be tentative when only one type of model provides confirmatory evidence.4
About one-fifth of the 461 firms in our sample dropped out of the study for reasons of acquisition, merger, bankruptcy, or liquidation by the end of 1968. These firms contributed observations to the sample until they were censored. Thus, the number of firm-years included in the study (2,510) was less than the maximum possible (461 x 6 = 2766). Right censoring of observations is common in analyses such as these and does not in and of itself bias parameter estimates.5 We used one-tailed tests to evaluate the statistical significance of coefficients pertaining to directional hypotheses (e.g., H1-) and two-tailed tests to evaluate the significance of non-directional hypotheses (e.g., H8 and H9).
Independent Variables
Measurements of top manager characteristics were based on the attributes of a firm's chief executive officer or, when a chief executive officer could not be identified, the president. Measures of the extent to which firms were free from competitive uncertainty and transaction-partner constraint were based on the concentration levels and transaction patterns of the primary 2-digit input-output (10) industries in which they produced. Firm primary 10 sector affiliations were updated annually. Industry concentration levels and interindustry transaction patterns were based on data from 1963. We measured the extent to which a firm's primary industry was free from competitive uncertainty by the absolute value of the difference between its 10 sector's concentration score and the mean manufacturing sector concentration score (.3901). A high value indicates that an industry was relatively competitive or oligopolized. The extent to which a firm's primary industry was free from transaction-partner constraint was measured directly by structural autonomy scores provided by Burt (1986: 16-17 The numerator of this ratio is operating income less interest expense, less income taxes, less dividends to common shareholders, less dividends to preferred stockholders, less change in deferred taxes. The denominator is the book value of total assets.
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The numerator of this ratio is the sum of market value of common equity, the book value of long-term debt, debt due within one year, and the liquidating value of preferred stock. The denominator is the book value of total assets. ered a function of mimicry variable counts over the previous three years (e .g., 1964, 1965, and 1966) .
The agency theory variables were also updated annually. Free cash flow was measured according to a ratio developed by Lehn and Poulsen (1989).8 Free cash flow in the absence of positive net-present-value projects was measured by the value of free cash flow when the q-ratio was less than one. The q-ratio was measured according to Amit, Livnat, and Zarowin (1989).9 The percentage of outside directors on a firm's board was computed using the ratio of non-principally affiliated (non-manager and non-owner) directors to total directors on a firm's board.
To ensure that our statistical models were well specified, we included a large number of other variables in our analyses that have been hypothesized to influence acquisition likelihood. The rationale for including these controls in our study, the measures used to operationalize them, and the effects they had on acquisition likelihood are all discussed in Appendix A. The data sources used to collect information on all the variables used in this study are provided in Appendix B. vide support for the class theory hypotheses advanced here. Models 2 and 4, which include the class theory variables, significantly improve on the explanatory power of models 1 and 3, their respective baseline models.
RESULTS

Means
Social Status
Corporations managed by CEOs with upper-class social origins were less likely than other firms to complete diversifying acquisitions in the 1960s. The upper-class-CEO effect was statistically significant in both the Poisson and logistic regression analyses. The probability of completing a diversifying acquisition was .084 for the average firm in this period. Having a CEO who was listed in a metropolitan social register and/or had graduated from an exclusive private secondary school decreased the probability of completing a diversifying 
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Resistance of Established Elite
Corporations whose boards included the directors of many other industrial firms-corporations that maintained many received and neutral interlocks-were less likely to complete diversifying acquisitions in the 1960s. The received interlock effect was statistically significant in both the Poisson and logistic regression analyses. The neutral interlock effect, though, was only significant in the Poisson regression analysis. For the average corporation, adding one received interlock decreased the probability of completing a diversifying acquisition by .009 (11 percent). The magnitude of this effect is comparable to those reported above, insofar as the number of received interlocks firms maintained ranged from 0 to 13 in our period. Falling in the 99th percentile of the sample with respect to received interlocks (maintaining 8 received interlocks) decreased the probability of completing a diversifying acquisition by .072 (86 percent) for the average firm. Thus, the results provide strong support for H6 but only weak support for H7. As such, they suggest that the representatives of large industrial firms discouraged the corporations on whose boards they sat from pursuing diversifying acquisitions, perhaps because their firms were at risk of becoming the targets of such acquisitions.
Elite Undergraduate and Graduate Management Education
In H8 and H9 we predicted that firms whose top managers held undergraduate and M.B.A. degrees from elite institutions would pursue diversifying acquisitions at a different rate than firms whose top managers did not hold such degrees. We did not predict a direction for the hypothesized associations because we allowed that elite undergraduate and graduate management education might have multiple contradictory effects on a CEO's proclivity to pursue acquisitions. The results fail to confirm H8, which pertains to the CEO's undergraduate education, but they do support H9, which pertains to the CEO's graduate management education. The elite M.B.A. degree effect was positive and statistically significant in both the Poisson and logistic regression analyses. This result is consistent with the speculation that CEOs with elite M.B.A. degrees were more capable of pursuing diversifying acquisitions because they had superior social network connections. It is also consistent, though, with the claim that such CEOs were more inclined to pursue diversifying acquisitions because they were steeped in the firm-as-portfolio model of corporate control. Having a CEO with an elite M.B.A. degree increased the probability of completing a diversifying acquisition by .063 (75 percent) for the average firm. The small percentage of CEOs who held an elite M.B.A. degree in our data set (about 6 percent), though, compromises the accuracy of this point estimate (although not the test of its statistical significance). Parameter estimates have high standard errors and are sensitive to measurement error when dichotomous independent variables are highly skewed, as is the case with our variable for the CEO's elite M.B.A. degree.
Ownership and Control
The more a corporation's stock was concentrated in the hands of a few related individuals, the less likely it was to complete diversifying acquisitions during the 1 960s. The magnitude of the stock ownership effect varied depending on the identity of the owning group. The relative magnitude and statistical significance of the three ownership effects were virtually identical in the Poisson and logistic regression analyses. For the average corporation, the probability of completing a diversifying acquisition decreased by .001 for each additional percentage of stock owned by the CEO. The probability of completing a diversifying acquisition decreased by slightly more, by .002, for each additional percentage of stock owned by other top managers. And the probability of completing an acquisition decreased even more, by .006, for each additional percentage of stock owned by outsiders (who typically held seats on the board). The magnitudes of these effects are quite large compared with the effects of other variables examined here. For example, falling in the 99th percentile of the sample with respect to CEO ownership (64 percent CEO ownership) decreased the probability of completing a diversifying acquisition by .064 (a 76-percent decrement in acquisition probability) for the average firm. Falling in the 99th percentile of the sample with respect to outsider ownership (32 percent) decreased the probability of completing a diversifying acquisition by .192 (229 percent) for the average firm. Thus, our results support H10 and H1 b, but not H1la. Family ownership groups were more likely than salaried professional managers to eschew diversifying acquisitions in the 1960s, presumably because they were less likely to benefit and more likely to lose from these acquisitions. A subset of family ownership groups, those represented in top management, however, were less averse to acquisitions in this period, presumably because they stood to obtain greater and more valued status and network embeddedness benefits from acquisition-induced corporate growth. We suspect that the impetus to pursue such benefits was greatest among first-generation owner-CEOs, whose status and embeddedness was less well established. Several first-generation owner-CEOs included in our data set (e.g., Charles "Tex" Thornton of Litton Industries, Norton Simon of Hunt Foods and Industries, and James Ling of Ling-Tempco-Vought) were tied to aggressive acquisition campaigns in the 1960s.
Alternative Accounts: Resource Dependence, New Institutional, and Agency Theories We found no support for the resource dependence perspective account of diversifying acquisitions in our 1960s data. Corporations producing in structurally autonomous industries were no less likely than other firms to complete diversifying acquisitions. This might reflect the fact that structural autonomy influences acquisition behavior through its impact on corporate strategy and structure. In reduced-form models that excluded our strategy and structure variables (available on request), structural autonomy reduced acquisition rates. Corporations producing in industries in which concentration levels differed from the manufacturing sector's average were also no less likely to complete diversifying acquisitions. In fact, firms producing in competitive or oligopolized industries were more likely to complete diversifying acquisitions-the industry concentration effect being statistically significant in both the Poisson and logistic regression analyses, although only at the .10 level in the latter. This might reflect the fact that U.S. antitrust enforcement in the 1960s targeted a few highly concentrated industries, most notably automobile manufacturing (Bittlingmayer, 1995), making diversification the only viable growth strategy in these industries. Supplemental analyses that examined industry differences in acquisition rates (available on request) appear to confirm this speculation. This suggests that future tests of the resource dependence perspective should take into account the historical specificity of hypothesized relations as well as the processes through which they operate (Dobbin and Dowd, 2000).
We found more support for the new institutional theory account. A rising number of acquisitions by other firms in a corporation's industry increased acquisition likelihood-this mimicry effect being statistically significant in both the Poisson and logistic regression analyses, although only at the .10 level in the latter. The probability of completing a diversifying acquisition increased by .002 with each additional acquisition completed in the previous three years by other firms in a corporation's primary industry. Falling in the 99th percentile with respect to the intraindustry acquisition variable (primarily producing in an industry in which firms completed 24 acquisitions in the previous three years) raised the probability of acquisition by .048 (57 percent). Being run by a finance-oriented CEO also increased acquisition likelihood, although this finance-CEO effect was only statistically significant in the Poisson regression analysis. We think we failed to find stronger evidence of a finance-CEO effect because this effect partly operates indirectly through its effects on corporate financial structure and organizational strategy and structure. In reduced-form logistic regression models that excluded these variables (available on request), having a CEO with a financial background increased the likelihood that corporations completed diversifying acquisitions. There is no evidence, though, that a rising number of acquisitions completed by other firms to which a corporation was interlocked increased its acquisition likelihood. (Mills, 1959; Domhoff, 1970; Useem, 1979) . To the best of our knowledge, however, no one has previously examined the impact of top managers' social status, religion, or location on corporate behavior. And only one series of studies has explored the impact of top managers' social club memberships on corporate behavior (Ratcliff, 1980a (Ratcliff, , 1980b is related to acquisition activity, although the direction of the relationship is subject to dispute. Good performance might increase a top management team's confidence that it can handle large and risky investments of the sort that diversifying acquisitions sometimes entail (Roll, 1986) . Poor performance, however, might lead a top management team to take on risky investment opportunities, such as diversifying acquisitions, in an attempt to turn performance around (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990).
We took into account high stock prices (indexed by the market-to-book ratio), leverage (measured by the debt-to-equity ratio), and performance (indexed by market returns) because exploratory analyses indicated that these economic factors sometimes had statistically significant effects on acquisition likelihood. As it turned out, though, the effects of these variables fell just short of statistical significance at the .10 level in the final model. We dropped growth (indexed by prior three years average sales growth) and liquidity (measured by the quick ratio) from consideration, because exploratory analyses revealed that these factors were not related to acquisition likelihood. We suspect that none of the economic controls influenced acquisition likelihood in our final model because we included many variables in our analyses that have been ignored by prior researchers. Every economic control except growth had a statistically significant effect on acquisition likelihood when we controlled only for firm size, prior firm acquisitions, and the five calendar-year dummy variables described above and below. 
Other
